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Introduction 
 
For Nietzsche and for Freud, whose publishing career blooms just as 
Nietzsche’s collapse put an end to his productive life, achieving self-knowledge 
presents a challenge. Nietzsche declares that: 
We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers: and with good reason. We have 
never looked for ourselves, - so how are we supposed to find ourselves? […] 
like somebody divinely absent-minded and sunk in his own thoughts who, 
the twelve strokes of midday having just boomed into his ears, wakes with a 
start and wonders ‘What hour struck?’, sometimes we too, afterwards rub 
our ears and ask, astonished, taken aback, ‘What did we actually experience 
then?’ or even, ‘Who are we, in fact?’ and afterwards, as I said, we count all 
twelve reverberating strokes of our experience, of our life, of our being – oh! 
And lose count… We remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do no 
understand ourselves, we must confusedly mistake who we are, (GM P I).i 
For Nietzsche, a new method is needed to address this problem of who we are. We 
need to pay attention to our experiences, and overcome the causal explanations 
that we currently apply to them after the fact, which conceal the complex activity 
involved in them. For Freud too, much of the self and its activity are currently 
unknown to us, and we are in need of a technique to navigate this uncharted 
 territory. Freud describes psychoanalysis as “a procedure for the investigation of 
mental processes which are almost inaccessible any other way” (SE 18, p. 235).ii 
Both Nietzsche and Freud employ a notion of dynamic drives, which take 
shape and develop in historical processes, in their explanations of human belief, 
reasoning, and behavior. Thus, central to their projects of self-knowledge is the task 
of revealing and understanding the activity of our drives. While there are various 
aspects to the challenge of self-knowledge in both authors, it is their techniques of 
uncovering and exploring drive activity that is the focus of this article.iii  
The full complexity of their different methods of exploring the drives, and 
understandings of the obstacles this exploration faces, which both thinkers develop 
and augment across their careers, cannot be detailed here. One important point of 
contrast in their approaches, however, serves to illustrate a methodological 
difficulty that needs to be addressed if we are interested in self-knowledge; namely, 
the limitations in taking either a solitary or a dialogical approach. For Nietzsche, as 
I will argue further below, solitude appears as a crucial dimension to any attempt to 
better know the self, while for Freud the project of revealing the hidden depths of 
the self is transplanted from the loneliness of the desert to the intimacy of the 
consulting room.  
Nietzsche himself suggests that every philosophy is a “confession of its 
author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.” (BGE 6) Thus, we might 
be tempted to provide a retrospective analysis of Nietzsche’s methodological 
justifications for escaping relationships with others as a necessary stage in a 
project of self-knowledge in terms of his own psychology. Whatever the various 
 motivations at work, however, the demand for a period of enforced exile and a 
capacity for solitude, is at least in part motivated by Nietzsche’s insights into 
obstacles to self-understanding that immersion in and dependence on society 
creates. At the same time, while we might be able to point to various non-epistemic 
interests that the psychotherapeutic relationship serves, the insistence on the 
relational elements in the process of psychoanalysis does have methodological 
justifications. Exploring why, in their attempts to reveal and understand the drive 
process at work within us, Nietzsche considers solitude to be a necessary practice 
while Freud takes dialogue, which I am using in the broad sense of communicating 
with and relating to another, to be indispensable, serves to clarify a genuine tension 
that an effective method of self-knowledge must navigate.  
I will proceed by first discussing the notion of drives as underlying our 
beliefs, conscious thoughts and feelings, and behaviors, which is present in both 
thinkers. The aim here is to show that despite significant differences in their 
understanding of drives and how they relate to the subject,iv there is sufficient 
similarity in this respect to allow a comparative assessment of their means of 
knowing the activity of these drives. I will then address why, for both Nietzsche and 
Freud, these drives have remained unknown, before exploring how, for Nietzsche, 
the practice of solitude and, for Freud, the relational phenomenon of transference 
allow them to be explored. Their opposing methodological motivations show the 
limitations in both solitary and dialogical approaches. An awareness of this tension 
allows us to navigate the pitfalls of operating either in solitude or in the context of 
relationships. I argue that the limitations of a purely solitary or dialogical approach 
 to self-knowledge point to the need to employ both solitude and dialogue in our 
attempt to know ourselves. Self-knowledge will require combining the capacity to 
endure solitude with the capacity to engage with others and become aware of how 
they shape our self-understanding.  
 
Drives and their vicissitudes  
 
Both Freud and Nietzsche explain our psychology and behavior in terms of 
the activity of dynamic drives. Nietzsche claims that “Our waking life is an 
interpretation of inner drive processes” (KSA 9:6[81]), while on Freud’s 
understanding, drives are the “ultimate cause of all activity” (SE 23, p. 48). In the 
standard translation Freud’s use of the term Trieb and his much less frequent use of 
the German Instinkt are problematically both rendered as instinct. I have adjusted 
the translation so that Trieb is rendered as drive, which better reflects the notion of 
a force or push that its derivation from the verb treiben [to push], would suggest. As 
Graham Parkes has pointed out, the use of this term in discussions of human 
psychology has a significant presence in the 18th century German thought that 
forms a common intellectual heritage for both Nietzsche and Freud.v  
So to what extent does this common heritage underpin a conceptual 
similarity in their use of the term?vi Ultimately, for Nietzsche all drives are wills to 
power: “our drives can be reduced to the will to power” (KSA 11:40[61]). That is 
they can all be characterized in terms of “spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, re-
interpreting, re-directing and formative forces” (GM II: 12). All drives share the 
 tendency to grow, expand, and assert their interpretation against other drives or 
wills to powers. Yet while they are all of the same character we can still talk of 
multiple wills to power. Nietzsche understands “man as a multiplicity of ‘wills to 
power’: each one with a multiplicity of means of expression and forms” (KSA 
12:I[58]). For different drives, or wills to power, this fundamental need to feel 
power takes different aims. We have a drive to truth, and a drive to conceal for 
example, both seeking to assert their dominance (BGE 230).  
For Freud too, the drive stimulus could be termed a “need” (SE 14, p. 119). 
On Freud’s understanding this is a need for satisfaction, understood as the removal 
of the stimulus at the drive’s source: 
The simplest and likeliest assumption as to the nature of drives would seem 
to be that in itself a drive is without quality, and, so far as mental life is 
concerned, is only to be regarded as a measure of the demand made upon 
the mind for work. What distinguishes the drives from one another and 
endows them with specific qualities is their relation to their somatic sources 
and to their aims. The source of a drive is a process of excitation occurring in 
an organ and the immediate aim of the drive lies in the removal of this 
organic stimulus. (SE 7, p. 168) 
Somatic sources refer to the place a drive originates from, or where the unknown 
somatic process from which it originates occurs, including the erotogenic zones.vii 
Thus, for Freud the motivating drive is explicitly an internal rather than an external 
stimulus, “a drive stimulus does not arise from within the world but from within 
the organism itself” (SE 14, p. 118).viii The aim on one level is always satisfaction, 
 understood as the removal of the stimulation at the drive’s source, but this requires 
different actions, depending on the somatic source. For example the oral drive has 
the aim of sucking,ix the child “proceeds to find this satisfaction by sucking 
rhythmically at some part of the skin or mucous membrane” (SE 7, p.181). Hence 
for Freud, as for Nietzsche, there are many different drives with different aims.  
Thus, while they characterize the fundamental character of drives 
differently, both Nietzsche and Freud recognize the existence of multiple drives, 
which are differentiated according to their aims. Freud always remains committed 
to a characterization of these multiple drives in terms of a dualistic division, 
replacing the opposition between ego, or self-preservation, and libido, or sexual, 
drives in his early work with the suggested dualism between the death and life 
drives: “Our views have from the very first been dualistic, and to-day they are even 
more definitely dualistic than before- now that we describe the opposition as being, 
not between ego drives and sexual drives but between life drives and death drives.” 
(SE 18, p. 53) Nietzsche, on the other hand, emphasizes the opposition between the 
individualizing Apollonian drive and the disintegrating effects of the Dionysian 
drive in The Birth of Tragedy, but later pictures a non-dualistic, changing hierarchy 
(GS 290, HH I P 7).  Regardless of this significant difference regarding the nature of 
the drives’ interaction, however, Freud and Nietzsche share the fundamental 
assumption that in order to investigate human behavior and experience we need to 
investigate the interaction of multiple drives.  
Further, for both thinkers these drives are not stable but undergo what 
Freud would call ‘vicissitudes’ (SE 14, p. 123). Thus, the attempt to understand the 
 activity of the drives involves tracing not only the history of their interaction, but 
the history of their emergence and development, on a social or an individual level. 
The differentiation of drives is an historical process. 
On Freud’s account, the intermediate aims, or actions, that a drive impels us 
towards, not only vary according to the drive’s source, but can change during a 
drive’s history. By the time of writing ‘Drives and their Vicissitudes’, it is clear that 
Freud believes that while the ultimate aim of satisfaction, through the removal of 
the state of stimulation, is constant, the intermediary aims can change (SE 14, pp. 
117-140). Freud suggests that “although the ultimate aim of each drive remains 
unchangeable, there may yet be different paths leading to the same ultimate aim; so 
that a drive may be found to have various nearer or intermediate aims, which are 
combined or interchanged with one another.” (SE 14, p. 122) Drives can come to 
acquire new intermediate aims, which “may be changed any number of times in the 
course of the vicissitudes which the drive undergoes during its existence” (SE 14, 
pp. 122-123).  Freud lists various types of vicissitudes:  
Reversal into opposite. 
Turning round upon the subject’s own self. 
Repression. 
Sublimation. (SE 14, p. 126) 
For example, the movement from sadism to masochism involves a reversal from 
activity to passivity, the active aim to torture becoming the passive aim to be 
tortured.  
 This transformation is associated with a change in the object: “The object is 
given up and replaced by the subject’s self. With the turning round upon the self the 
change from an active to a passive instinctual aim is also effected.” (SE 14, p. 127) 
Hence, Paul Katsafanas’ claim that in Freud “the drive itself is indifferent to the 
object” is misleading. x Changes in the object a drive aims at are connected to a 
change in the nature of the drive. To overlook this exaggerates the stability of the 
drives in Freud and in using Freud to help elucidate the concept of drives in 
Nietzsche Katsafanas underplays the extent to which drives can change for 
Nietzsche too. 
Indeed, in Nietzsche, this process of change is even less constrained than in 
Freud. Here the ultimate aim is always characterized by a will towards power, but 
without Freud’s mechanical model, which ties a drive’s aim to its original somatic 
source, the vicissitudes which a given drive can take in the expression of this aim 
are endless. For example, we see how the drive to truth begins as a drive to fix and 
make stable as a prerequisite for the language and rules on which our social 
existence depends (TL). Nietzsche suggests that we then came to compare different 
possible accounts, and ultimately to question the errors that once counted as 
truths. Thus what ‘truth’ is as the aim of the ‘drive for truth’ is not stable, but moves 
from the aim of creating convictions to questioning them: “every kind of drive took 
part in the fight about the ‘truths’; the intellectual fight became an occupation, 
attraction, profession, duty, dignity- knowledge and the striving for the truth finally 
took their place as a need among the other needs. Henceforth, not only faith and 
conviction, but also scrutiny, denial suspicion, and contradiction were a power”  (GS 
 110). Hence, when Ken Gemes, who rightly stresses that the dominance of any 
given drive is not stable and that weaker drives can be sublimated in the service of 
the aim of a master drive, talks of a drive having a ‘determinate aim’, this is 
problematic if we read ‘determinate’ as fixed.xi The aim of a drive for Nietzsche is 
itself subject to change. Thus, not only do Nietzschean drives co-opt each other and 
form new unities, as Gemes describes, their very aim and character can also change 
in this process. In addition to the alignments of drives undergoing vicissitudes, the 
nature of a given drive undergoes a process of historical development in Nietzsche 
as in Freud. 
Clearly, Freud has a physical account of drives related to the individual’s 
body, which is very different from Nietzsche’s notion of forces which can be 
understood as prior to and beyond individuals. We can see, however, that for both 
thinkers, the form a drive takes, as well as its interactions with other drives, and 
thus the role it will play in explaining our behavior and conscious experiences, is 
historical, contingent and changeable. Thus, explaining our conscious experiences 
in terms of drive activity, involves tracing the historical formation, development 
and interaction of these drives. This means that the approaches they take in 
attempting to explore and justify their hypotheses of the character of the drives, 
can be taken to be mutually informative even while these hypotheses differ in 
significant ways.  
 
The need for an art of interpretation  
 
 Why then is knowing the drives a problem? A central tenant in the work of 
both Nietzsche and Freud is that our conscious mental activity is only a small part 
of the activity that makes up the self. To think that consciousness “constitutes the 
kernel of man” or see it “as ‘the unity of the organism’” is, according to Nietzsche, a 
“ridiculous overestimation and misapprehension of consciousness” (GS 11). In fact  
“The greatest part of our being is unknown to us.” (KSA 8:32[8]) What is 
immediately available to consciousness is not the sum of who we are but just the 
surface ripples from which we hope to decipher what goes on in the depths. 
Nietzsche suggests that “there is, with all actions, much unconscious intentionality, 
and what comes into the foreground as “will” and “purpose”, is often open to 
interpretation [ausdeutbar] and in itself only a symptom.” (KSA 12:I[76]) Elsewhere 
he writes: “The so-called ‘motive’: another error. Merely a surface phenomenon of 
consciousness, an accompaniment to an act, which conceals rather than exposes the 
antecedentia of the act.” (TI The Four Great Errors 3) Thus, the self in Nietzsche 
involves much that is unconscious, though it is not clear he would extend this to 
concepts or ideas as Freud does.  
For Freud the treatment of patients required the postulation of a dynamic 
unconscious. “The mind of the hysterical patient is full of active and yet 
unconscious ideas; all her symptoms proceed from such ideas. It is in fact the most 
striking character of the hysterical mind to be ruled by them.” (SE 12, p. 262) 
Psychoanalytic therapy involves bringing these ideas into consciousness. What 
Richard Wollheim suggests is increasingly the focus of Freud’s interestxii is what 
Freud calls “the living forces which oppose themselves to” the “reception” of such 
 unconscious ideas. (SE 12, 264) That is, he is as much concerned with the forces, 
which will be explained in terms of the interactions of drives, that keep these ideas 
from becoming conscious as with the unconscious ideas themselves.  
Thus, with both Nietzsche and Freud, the claim that our mental activity is 
not synonymous with what is conscious introduces a problem of self-knowledge, in 
so far as we can no longer take our mental life to be transparent to introspection, 
but must attempt to decipher this activity by examining the thoughts, feelings, and 
actions that are immediately available to observation as signs of further, ultimately 
drive, activity that is not. Both employ the notions of interpretation and translation 
to describe the task of bringing to light the activity of our drives. Freud describes 
psychoanalysis as involving an “art of interpretation” (SE 18, p.239), while 
Nietzsche’s genealogical investigation provides an alternative interpretation to that 
of the “bad arts of interpretation” that he criticizes, and which fail to bring us to an 
understanding of what we are (BGE 22). This interpretation of experiences and 
behavior in terms of the unconscious activity of our drives, confronts a problem of 
translation. Freudian therapy relies on the “translation of what is unconscious into 
what is conscious” (SE 16, p. 435), while Nietzsche is committed to the “extravagant 
task” which is “to translate man back into nature”, digging beneath the “gold-dust of 
unconscious human vanity” in order to discern the “terrible basic text [schreckliche 
Grundtext] homo natura” (BGE 230). Freud frames the act of translation as making 
conscious what is currently unconscious, where Nietzsche sets up the task as the 
need to translate our existing, conscious self-interpretation into the language of the 
drives that lie behind it. The notion of translation, however, runs both ways in both 
 thinkers. They aim to consciously understand the unconscious activity of the drives, 
in order to be able to better understand our conscious experiences. Thus, they aim 
to translate what is currently conscious into the terms of drive activity, but do to 
this we must be able to become conscious of and talk about unconscious drive 
activity.  
Further, for both writers there are reasons why we fail to translate the 
conscious signs of our drive activity accurately. I will now turn to how their arts of 
interpretation are designed to overcome these obstacles.   
 
Nietzschean solitude  
 
For Nietzsche error and simplification are part of who we are. There are 
various “erroneous articles of faith, which were passed on by inheritance further 
and further, and finally almost became part of the basic endowment of the species,” 
(GS 110).  Simplification, denial and forgetfulness have thus been part of our 
survival and development.  
Forgetfulness is no mere vis inertiae, as the superficial believe; it is rather an 
active – in the strictest sense positive – inhibiting capacity… The temporary 
shutting of the doors and windows of consciousness; guaranteed freedom 
from disturbance by the noise and struggle caused by our underworld of 
obedient organs as they co-operate with and compete against one another. 
(GM II, 1)   
 Our very sense of self, and our capacity to communicate and function in a group 
depend on denying the reality of the constant activity of our drives. We invent 
stable concepts that allow us to develop language, give promises, assign blame and 
punishment and then account for our actions in these simplified terms which deny 
the presence of multiple drives. These inventions form the horizons of our 
existence: “A living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only within a horizon.” 
(UM II, 1, p. 63)xiii  
If we are to confront the multiplicity of drives within us, and translate our 
current understanding of ourselves, our actions and relationships into terms which 
acknowledge this activity, we have to be capable of questioning the horizons that 
our existence depends on. Thus, for Nietzsche, an honest self-investigation cannot 
occur if we are too attached to our current form of existence.  
An inability to endure solitude is a symptom of such attachment. Nietzsche 
asks “who today knows what solitude is?” (HH I P 3) He claims of “the herd animals 
and apostles of equality wrongly called ‘free spirits’” that “not a single one […] 
would be able to endure loneliness.” (KSA 12:3[13]) His point is that those who think 
themselves radical would not dare to follow their investigations to the point where 
they would have no common beliefs to bind them to the fellowship of mankind. 
Even if they celebrate their independence of thought, they will shy away from 
findings that threaten their social existence by exposing its presuppositions as 
illusions. For instance, Nietzsche’s understanding of the various drives that operate 
behind our concept of punishment, and behind our justification of punishment in 
terms of justice, are undermining of this practice (GM II, 4). Similarly his account of 
 the origins of bad conscience, suggest this “torture-chamber” has developed in a 
contingent historical process (GM II, 16). This challenges the necessity of the guilt 
that helps regulate our social existence.xiv An unconstrained investigation may 
undermine further practices, and leave us isolated from the community they 
depend on. Solitude is necessary because it is needed to remove the limitations on 
the pursuit of truth of caring about the opinions of others and of being attached to 
the shared set of ‘herd’ beliefs, and to our current existence which is held together 
by these beliefs.  
We also need solitude in order to be able to pay better attention to the 
drives which are covered over in society. “We are afraid that when we are alone 
and quiet something will be whispered into our ear, and so we hate quietness and 
deafen ourselves with sociability.” (UM Schopenhauer as Educator 5) Part of the 
difficulty with dealing with solitude is being afraid of what we will discover about 
ourselves. We need the chance to ‘hear’ other drives than those that are engaged in 
social interaction. Or as Parkes puts it, lack of intercourse with other people will 
“allow the persons of the psyche to present themselves all the more clearly”.xv 
Through solitude we can become attuned to the internal dialogue that occurs 
between different drives or wills to power within us.  
Solitude need not be a permanent condition. As Michael Ure argues we can 
view solitude as a stage to be passed through, after which new kinds of society and 
relationships may be possible.xvi Freedom from society is not the goal of 
transformation but a necessary part of a method of transformation. It is required 
 for the pursuit of a critical and honest investigation that will lead to a new self-
knowledge. Zarathustra declares:  
Truthful – thus I call the one who goes into Godless deserts and has 
broken his reverential heart. 
In the yellow sun and burned by the sun he will squint thirstily at the 
islands rich in springs, where living beings repose beneath dark trees. 
But his thirst does not persuade him to become like those 
comfortable creatures: for where there are oases there are also images of 
idols. 
Ravenous, violent, solitary, Godless: thus does the lion-will want 
itself. 
Free from the happiness of vassals, redeemed from Gods and 
adorations, fearless and fearsome, great and solitary: such is the will of him 
who is truthful [Wahrhaftigen]. (Z II On the Famous Wise Men) 
For Nietzsche, a truthful investigation thus involves setting oneself apart from 
other, comfortable creatures, and the idols that they share, and being prepared to 
endure alienation from our fellow members of society.  
The limitation to Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome social constraints in his 
pursuit of translating the text of homo natura is that at least some of the activity of 
our drives concerns other subjects. The aim of some drives, and thus the history of 
that drive’s activity and development, can only be interpreted in relation to the 
objects they aim at, which in many cases are other people. For example, we have 
 sexual drives, and drives to be recognized and admired, or, as seems to be 
suggested by Nietzsche’s own Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a drive to give, or share.  
For Nietzsche, knowledge of the drives requires engaging with them, and 
not simply observing them from the outside. He is opposed to “‘contemplation’ 
[Anschauung] without interest” (which is, as such, a non-concept and an absurdity)” 
and suggests instead the need for “having in our power the ability to engage and 
disengage our ‘pros’ and  ‘cons’” (GM III 12). Nietzsche’s methodology of 
engagement suggests, therefore, that with these other directed drives we must 
engage with their directedness, and this includes engaging with the people they are 
directed towards. 
Nietzsche in fact does advocate learning about oneself indirectly, in terms of 
the outward expressions of one’s drives, or projections. He spends a great deal of 
time discussing figures whom he has admired, or feels the need to combat, 
including Goethe, Plato, Schopenhauer, and of course Wagner, with whom he had a 
personal relationship. He is aware that his changing attitude to Schopenhauer and 
Wagner, whom he once greatly admired but comes to so harshly criticize, relates to 
what he, or his drives, have needed at different times. In Ecce Homo he assesses his 
early Untimely Meditations, claiming that:  
Now, when I look back from a distance at the circumstances of which these 
essays are a witness, I would not wish to deny that fundamentally they 
speak only of me. The essay ‘Wagner in Bayreuth’ is a vision of my future; on 
the other hand in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ it is my innermost history, my 
evolution that is inscribed. (EH The Untimely Essays 3) 
 The emphasis, however, is on breaking and getting distance on one’s attachments 
in order to understand them, not on exploring them in dialogue with others. 
Nietzsche’s break with Schopenhauer and Wagner allows him to assess what had 
previously drawn him to them, and how he had hidden behind them.  
Thus, given his own insights into the need to engage with, or “live in” the 
drives (KSA 9:11[141], p.494) there is still a potential limitation in Nietzsche’s 
approach, because even while Nietzsche explores phenomenon such as projection 
and transference, he is trying to understand the relational, object-orientated 
character and development of drives in abstraction from this relational activity. If 
we are to understand the activity and emergence of our drives, surely we have to 
explore them in their activity and development, which means in the context of the 
relationships they work and are formed in? We cannot understand relational 
activity by excluding ourselves from relationships. Nor is it enough to remember 
our past relationships. Where we have misunderstood, concealed or denied the 
nature of our drives, we have to have a way of examining their activity outside of 
these disguised operations. For Nietzsche this involves distance from the obscuring 
factors of the relationships, but this only allows us to remember and reflect on the 
activity of a drive that is other regarding not fully engage with it.  
 
Freudian transference  
 
The need to explore drives in relationships with others is a fundamental 
tenet of Freud’s psychoanalytic method, in which the occurrence of transference in 
 the relationship between patient and doctor, or analysand and analyst is essential. 
“Classically, the transference is acknowledged to be the terrain on which all the 
basic problems of a given analysis play themselves out: the establishment, 
modalities, interpretation and resolution of the transference are in fact what define 
the cure.”xvii Transference in simple terms is the transference of feelings and 
desires, both positive and negative, from earlier relational experiences onto the 
figure of the doctor. Transference when positive can serve a helpful function of 
facilitating the patient’s willingness to cooperate and to listen to the doctor’s 
suggested interpretations. Despite the functional use of a positive transference 
ultimately, however, both positive transference, and the negative transference it 
often gives way to, indicate a resistance to the therapy.  
Resistance can take different forms and is a concept that undergoes ongoing 
development and revision in Freud’s work. It underpins the various ways an 
analysand resists analysis. The idea of resistance is based on the assumption that it 
is not just the case that some things happen to be unconscious. The unconscious 
contains that which, as Wollheim put it, “was not only unadmitted but inadmissible 
to consciousness”.xviii Various representations bound to a drive are repressed and 
prevented from becoming conscious because to satisfy the drive would provoke 
displeasure or threaten self-preservation. Repression thus “lies at the root of the 
constitution of the unconscious”.xix  
Psychoanalytic method is, therefore, focused around combating the forces of 
repression: “By carrying what is unconscious on into what is conscious, we lift the 
repressions, we remove the preconditions for the formation of symptoms, we 
 remove the pathogenic conflict into a normal one for which it must be possible 
somehow to find a solution.” (SE 16, p.435) The forces of repression, however, 
resist the discovery of what is repressed. “The resistance accompanies the 
treatment step by step.” (SE 12, p. 103) In his late work, Freud holds that the 
repressed itself offers no resistance, but the same defensive forces which carried 
out repression remain operative. “Resistance during treatment arises from the 
same higher strata and systems of the mind which originally carried out 
repression.” (SE 18, p. 19) The aim of therapeutic practice is summarized thus by 
Freud: “Descriptively speaking, it is to fill in gaps in memory; dynamically speaking 
it is to overcome resistances due to repression.”(SE 12, p.148)  
Transference is the “strongest weapon of resistance” (SE 12, 104). It 
distracts the patient. For example, where they profess love to the analyst, this 
comes to dominate the session, or, in the negative forms, justifies a refusal to listen 
to the analyst. In general, identifying resistances is an important part of the 
analyst’s progress is getting to the root of their patient’s symptoms, but the 
transference not only indicates that the analyst is approaching the site of repressed 
conflict but does the “service of making the patient’s hidden and forgotten erotic 
impulses immediate and manifest.” (SE 12, p. 108) This is because it actualizes the 
childhood conflict, “the patient does not say he remembers that he used to be 
defiant and critical towards his parent’s authority; instead he behaves that way to 
the doctor.” (SE 12, p. 150)  
A ‘transference neurosis’ is thus formed, which Freud claims is “the essential 
subject of psychoanalytic study” (SE 18, p. 52). Because “one cannot overcome an 
 enemy who is absent or not within range” (SE 12, p. 152), transference is necessary 
to bring the repressed into range. It allows this because it offers a contained 
environment in which it can operate and its activity can thereby be explored: 
‘We render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the 
right to assert itself in a definite field. We admit it into the transference as a 
playground in which it is allowed to expand in almost complete freedom and 
in which it is expected to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic 
instincts that is hidden in the patients mind. […] The transference thus 
creates an intermediate region between illness and real life through which 
the transition from the one to the other is made. The new condition has 
taken over all the features of the illness; but it represents an artificial illness 
which is at every point accessible to our intervention. (SE 12, p. 154) 
Thus, the transference opens the repressed activity of the drives to understanding 
and neurotic conflicts to resolution. The analyst aims to force the transference 
neurosis out of the realm of the repetition of conflict and into memory, but before it 
can be conceptually recognized it needs to be experienced in the therapeutic 
context. The aim is to turn “a drive conflict which is at the moment latent into one 
which is currently active” (SE 23, p. 231). At the height of the transference 
resistance the drives that feed it can be discovered (SE 12, p. 155). The transference 
relationship particularly favors the return of the “affects belonging to the repressed 
material” (SE 23, p. 258) It then becomes possible to “attack” at the “point made 
accessible” through the transference (SE, 16, p. 436). Thus “in the hands of the 
physician it [the transference] becomes the most powerful therapeutic instrument 
 and it plays a part scarcely to be over-estimated in the dynamics of the process of 
cure.” (SE 18, p. 247) 
That transference turns out to be the most powerful form of resistance and 
thus the most powerful tool of the analyst in unmasking the forces of repression 
involved in resistance is, Freud believes, informative of the nature of the drives and 
their activity, supporting his claim for the prominence of sexual drives: 
If further proof is needed of the truth that the motive forces behind the 
formation of neurotic symptoms are of a sexual nature, it would be found in 
the fact that in the course of analytic treatment a special emotional relation 
is regularly formed between the patient and physician. This goes far beyond 
rational limits. It varies between the most affectionate devotion and the 
most obstinate enmity and derives all of its characteristics from earlier 
erotic attitudes of patients which have become unconscious. (SE 18, p. 247) 
Hence, the transference is informative not only of individual histories and neurosis 
but of Freud’s broader theory of the drives.   
Thus, unlike solitary self-examination which can only recall or imagine 
relational activity, Freud’s psychoanalytic method allows drives that have others as 
their objects to be exposed and re-examined as they operate and are experienced in 
relation to another. This is not to say that self-examination has not played an 
important role in the development of psychoanalytic theory. For Freud, as for 
Nietzsche, simple introspection is inadequate for self-understanding, given key 
aspects of the self are unconscious, but Freud attempts to decipher the activity of 
his unconscious through the analysis of his own dreams.  His self-analysis was not 
 undertaken entirely alone, however. During his self-analysis Freud met with and 
wrote frequent letters to his one time close friend and “understanding critic” 
Wilhelm Fleiss, often discussing his own dreams, as well as his patients and his 
theoretical developments.xx Further, in these letters Freud suggests that his self-
analysis depended on insights reached in treating his patients: “I have realized why 
I can analyze myself only with the help of knowledge obtained objectively (like an 
outsider). True self-analysis is impossible; otherwise there would be no [neurotic] 
illnesses. Since I am contending with some kind of puzzle in my patients, this is 
bound to hold me up in my self-analysis as well”.xxi Freud’s self-analysis was not, 
therefore, a solitary activity. Given, however, his self-analysis did not involve a 
transference relationship between analysand and analyst, while it was sufficient to 
help in the development of his theory of the drives, the psychoanalytic 
methodology he subsequently refined might have revealed his own self-analysis as 
incomplete had he undertaken analysis with another analyst.   
What then are the problems that this relational approach engenders? Firstly, 
Freud comments that study of the transference neurosis yields knowledge of the 
sexual, object oriented drives, but he himself seems to acknowledge that there are 
other drives that remain a comparative mystery. “The analysis of the transference 
neuroses forced upon our notice the opposition between the ‘sexual drives’, which 
are directed towards an object, and certain other drives, with which we were very 
insufficiently acquainted and which we described provisionally as the ‘ego-drives’ 
[Ichtriebe].” (SE 18, p. 51) Attempting to know the ego instincts has been a process 
of “groping in the dark” (SE 18, p. 51). Freud admits “these ‘ego-drives” remain 
 strange” and that “The difficulty remains that psychoanalysis has not enabled us 
hitherto to point to any [ego-] drives other than the libidinal ones.” (SE 18, p. 53) So 
one concern is that the transference method will only yield up the activity of object 
orientated drives. As Freud says, a lack of any revelation of non libidinal drives “is 
no reason for our falling in with the conclusion that no others in fact exist.” (SE 18, 
p. 53)    
There is a second Nietzschean concern that the relationship with the 
analyst, both with its transference effects which resonate with past relationships, 
and with feelings that may be germane to this new relationship, could operate as a 
limit for enquiry. The desire to gain approval, share beliefs, or simply sustain the 
relationship, may prevent some drives from being acknowledged that would 
threaten this particular relationship, and the pre-requisites for social interactions 
in general.  
Finally, there is the particular concern of the power dimensions that are in 
play. The needs and aims of the analyst’s own drives could determine the content of 
what is discovered. That is, when the analyst interprets our conscious experiences 
in terms of the unconscious activity of our drives, this interpretation may be 
directed by the unconscious activity of their own drives. In Nietzschean terms, the 
wills to power of the analyst need expression and dominance and will seek to find 
them through the analyst’s work, asserting their interpretation in the 
interpretation of the patient’s drive activity.  
This can operate at various levels. We could talk about the will to power of 
analysts, as Nietzsche talks about the will to power of priests (GM I: 7), in terms of 
 the consolidation of their own power position as healers, in which they have power 
over their patients and power in society. This secures the satisfaction of their 
general will to power as individuals. The expression of their will to power through 
their power as respected analysts, requires them to find evidence for their theories, 
and for their own necessity as interpreters. This relates to Michel Foucault’s 
analysis of the repressive hypothesis, which suggestions the very idea of a hidden 
sexuality is used to support practices of uncovering this sexuality, which would 
include the practice of psychoanalysis.xxii  
We also need to recognize the possibility that particular wills to power 
within the analyst, seek their particular satisfactions through the process of 
interpreting the drive activity of another. For example, the priests in Nietzsche’s 
analysis benefit from the Christian interpretation because it gives them power in 
their role as priests, but particular drives within them, such as a drive to cruelty, 
will also use Christianity as a vehicle for their expression. Thus a relational method 
of discovering the drives has to contend with the relational operation of drives, 
which may shape what is discovered.  
 
The methodological dilemma 
 
There is then a general methodological difficulty present in either method, 
which is inherent to the nature of all methodological assumptions, that they will 
favor the discovery of particular evidence, and the further problematic that 
 relationships with others may limit or shape the content of our investigations 
because of the nature of these relationships.  
To consider first the general problem, it is clear that a method that involves 
relationships with others will reveal activity of drives involving others as their 
objects, but might at the same time tend to overlook the possibility of other drives 
or forms of drive activity. A purely solitary approach, on the other hand, will be 
able to pay attention to what is covered over or drowned out when we are 
absorbed in engagements with others, but may give a very partial understanding of 
drive activity that is other regarding. Of course, solitary reflection does not have to 
ignore other regarding drives, but by examining them in abstraction it assumes that 
we can understand drives when their objects are other people in the same way that 
we can understand drives when their objects are passive, and fails to explore the 
interaction of our drives with the drives of others. 
Any investigation that makes assumptions in its method may reinforce those 
assumptions. Both Freud and Nietzsche are clear that assumptions are unavoidable 
and their awareness that they are employing assumptions, such as the death drive 
or the will to power, that may need to be revised is a crucial step to mitigating the 
problem. For Freud, it is important that definitions should not be treated as rigid, 
and he refers to his original dualistic categorization of the instincts as a “working-
hypothesis”, which may be, and indeed in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ is, 
replaced (SE 14, pp. 117, 123, SE 18, pp. 7-65). For Nietzsche, in turn, thinking 
through whether everything can be understood in terms of the “reality of our 
drives” is described as an “experiment” (BGE 36). Crucially, they are both aware of 
 the status of their assumptions as assumptions, which may come to be revised (SE 
18, p. 51). They both also conduct their investigations with a sensitivity to the 
inevitability that their own perspective will tend towards reinforcing itself. 
Nietzsche in particular aims to cultivate a capacity to expand and move between 
perspectives to avoid becoming entrenched in any one interpretation of experience. 
We must learn “to look into the world through as many eyes as possible, to live in 
drives and activities so as to create eyes for ourselves” (KSA 9:11[141], p.494). 
In addition to an awareness of the hypothetical status of any assumptions, 
varying the methodological approach taken could help avoid the general problem 
that theories tend towards self-validation. Widening the set of practices used to 
investigate the unknown self to include both solitary and engaged moments could 
potentially widen the sphere of what is investigated. Given solitary approaches will 
tend to overlook or misunderstand any drives that are operating relationally, while 
a relational approach may exclude the recognition of drives that fall outside 
relationships, or those that threaten the very relationship it depends on, 
conducting both solitary and relational investigations will allow a broader 
recognition of drives and the nature of their activity than either method will allow 
if pursued exclusively. This suggests that it is advantageous to use both solitary and 
dialogical approaches.  
If then, a purely solitary approach risks missing important aspects of drive 
activity, it is worth addressing whether the additional concerns that a dialogical 
approach introduces can be overcome. In relation to Nietzsche’s concern that our 
dependence on relationships may limit our investigations, preventing us from 
 reaching conclusions that would leave us isolated by forcing us to reject the beliefs 
that bind us into a community, what is really required is an attitude of, or capacity 
for, solitude. The need to obtain the capacity for solitude does not rule out that part 
of our investigation into the subterranean activity of the self might be carried out in 
the context of relationships. Literal solitude might perhaps be employed to 
cultivate this capacity, as well as to heighten an awareness of the operation of intra 
rather than inter subjective drive activity, but need not be a permanent condition.  
Nietzsche’s method requires a capacity for both attachment and 
detachment, he advocates a kind of skepticism that is not symptomatic of 
disinterest, or a failure to fully embrace or occupy a belief or perspective, but 
rather an ability to move between and let go of any belief or perspective. One must 
even be careful not to “cleave to one’s own detachment” (BGE 41). He declares that 
“Freedom from convictions of any kind, the capacity for an unconstrained view 
pertains to strength.” (A 54) It is perhaps the same kind of capacity to engage and 
disengage, which he advocates in relation to our beliefs, that would need to be 
cultivated in respect to relationships. What matters is that we have a capacity to 
endure solitude which means we do not shy away from exploring our drives to the 
point where they may undermine existing relationships and forms of relationships. 
This does not preclude entering into relationships as part of a broader process of 
self-knowledge. 
Whether we are talking about our beliefs or relationships, it may be alleged 
that this detachment means that one does not fully believe, or does not fully engage 
in the relationship, and thus does not completely experience the nature of belief or 
 relating. Nietzsche does not want us to only superficially engage. Rather, the aim in 
the Nietzschean method is to engage with but not to cling to a belief, or another 
person, out of a need for belief or relationships in general. Nietzsche’s contention 
would be that where there is such dependence, the need to believe, or to relate, 
works to cover over its own role in supporting the belief or the relationship and 
limits our self-understanding of why we believe or feel something. A proper 
understanding of a belief or relationship therefore, requires combining engagement 
with a capacity for detachment.  
The role of transference in the psychoanalytic method does seem to be in 
tension not just with a requirement for actual solitude, which could be limited to 
phases, but with this requirement for detachment. Transference seems to require 
that the actual need to relate in certain ways be actively lived through in order for it 
to be understood. If transference really does reveal drives, or drive activity, that 
would be inaccessible without the very dependence that Nietzsche would see as 
acting as a limit on enquiry, then are the limits it places on our enquiry 
unavoidable?  
Nietzsche does not think we can operate without limits to our enquiry. 
Rather, his aim is that these limits are ones that we can become sufficiently 
detached from to be able revise or redraw the horizons, given that “for humans 
alone among the animals there are no eternal horizons and perspectives.” (GS 143) 
For him, this ongoing process of detachment is one that solitude is crucial to, we 
start with limits to where our investigation could take us because of who we are, 
but by developing the ability to endure isolation we move the boundaries that 
 originally defined what self-knowledge was possible. If we return to the role of 
transference in psychoanalysis we find that while it does involve the kind of 
dependence that would seem to be in tension with the Nietzschean project, the 
explicit aim in the analytic process is to overcome this dependence. The success of 
psychoanalysis is measured by the resolution of the transference, which is “one of 
the main tasks of the treatment” (SE 12, p. 118), not its continuation. Thus, 
transference could be used as a stage within a project of self-knowledge that 
involves its own self-overcoming. Solitude might then extend this project into 
territory that we could not enter in the context of dependency on others, and we 
might return to relational contexts free from dependence, to make new discoveries 
in turn.  
There remains the further problem, however, of the influence of the other 
that the relational process introduces. If the goal were to step beyond 
interpretations, it would certainly be a fundamental flaw that relying on another in 
the process of interpreting our drives will always involve the interpretations of this 
other. Once, however, we accept, as Nietzsche would, that we cannot help but 
interpret according to some perspective, it seems no more inherently problematic 
that their drives will influence the results of understanding our drives than that 
ours will. What matters in both cases is an awareness that this is occurring, which 
is part of the understanding of the drives that we are aiming at. 
Discussions of counter-transference in psychoanalytic literature, 
acknowledge the need to cultivate this awareness. Freud insists that in order to be 
fully aware of counter transference, where the analyst’s own unresolved drive 
 complexes become involved in their interactions with the patient and 
interpretations of the material under analysis, an analyst must have had successful 
analysis: “he should have undergone a psychoanalytic purification and have 
become aware of those complexes of his own which would be apt to interfere with 
his grasp of what the patient tells him.” (SE 12, p. 116) Donald Winnicott observes 
that an analyst can have feelings of love and hate towards their patient both for 
reasons to do with the patient and to do with the analyst. To manage feelings of 
hate it is necessary that “through his own analysis he has become free from vast 
reservoirs of unconscious hate belonging to the past and to inner conflicts”.xxiii 
Later analysts have recognized the possibility of using counter-transference in the 
analytic process. Paula Heimann suggests: “The analyst’s counter-transference is an 
instrument of research into the patient’s unconscious.”xxiv She argues that the aim is 
not a lack of feeling but the ability to subordinate feelings in the analytic task. 
Heimann suggests that by noticing their own feelings in response to the patient, 
analysts can learn about the patient through their own unconscious reactions as 
well as their conscious interpretation of the material, as the counter-transference is 
a reaction to the patient’s activity. The analyst needs to pay attention to his or her 
own feelings, and aided by having worked through their own conflicts should be 
able to avoid imputing to the patient what belongs to him or herself. Addressing the 
existence of counter-transference through psychoanalytic methods does not, of 
course, challenge the paradigms of psychoanalytic theory, but it does show that 
built into the methodological approach is an awareness of the inevitability that the 
analyst’s own make up will influence the interpretation, and that this can only be 
 mitigated against by acknowledging this and exploring it as part of an ongoing 
project of self-knowledge on the analyst’s as well as on the analysand’s part.  
We may, however, have a particular concern that it is not only the case that 
the perspective of the other influences the interpretation we arrive at with another, 
but that power strategies may have a distorting effect, for example by suggesting a 
self-understanding that supports a particular power dynamic. Clearly, in the case of 
analysis it is in the interests of the analyst to reinforce psychoanalytic theory and 
their own indispensability. This does not, however, mean that the results of their 
investigations are not genuinely illuminating of the analysand’s unconscious life. 
Even if we discover that relationships always involve power strategies, this does 
not mean that we would want to forsake the potential joys and benefits of all 
relationships. In the case of self-knowledge, we can choose to accept the risk that 
power strategies may influence our discoveries, for the possible benefit of revealing 
aspects of the self that require engaging with others.  
In assessing if this risk is worthwhile we need to consider whether in the 
case of projects of self-knowledge the involvement of power dynamics is 
particularly problematic. A concern, explored in the work of Foucault, is that this 
process of producing self-knowledge is productive of a subjugated self. However, as 
Foucault himself suggests, if existing hierarchies operate through the production of 
a particular type of self, then challenging them requires a project of forming an 
alternative self. To attempt such a task is urgent “if it is true after all that there is no 
first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one 
has to oneself.”xxv A pre-requisite to this form of resistance is to understand how 
 the self has been shaped according to power strategies and in ways that reinforce 
existing power structures. Thus, if we use psychoanalysis, and other relational 
contexts, as a path of self-knowledge, we need to use them not only to discover our 
other regarding drives but also to discover the ways in which our relationships, 
including their power dynamics, shape these drives, their interactions and our 
knowledge of them.  
In addition to cultivating an awareness of the presence of power dynamics 
in all relationships, we can also mitigate their having a limiting effect on our 
enquiry by not relying exclusively in our self-exploration on this relational 
situation. That is, if there are vested interests in the particular relationship 
involved in psychoanalysis, it is important that we also explore ourselves in other 
ways in order to provide alternative perspectives. This can be through both solitary 
exploration and through alternative relationships with different power dynamics. 
Just as it is important to move between perspectives for Nietzsche, it is important 
to be able to move in and out of relational contexts and between different types of 
relationships. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We cannot step beyond relationships if we are to understand what is 
relational in us, and therefore we cannot but interact with the aims of the other’s 
drives in a broad project of self-knowledge. What we must aspire to, therefore, is 
deepening our awareness of the effects of the aims of the other’s drives on the 
 process of enquiry. This awareness needs to be developed both through solitude 
and through dialogue. Commitment to pursing self-knowledge without limitations 
requires us to step away and get distance on our relationships, cultivating an 
independence and detachment that allows the pursuit of knowledge even at the 
cost of the destruction of our relationships. We also need to explore the nature of 
drives in their relational activity, observing how they interact and shape each 
other, which requires a capacity to engage with others.  
Thus, the limitations of both solitude and dialogue as methods of achieving 
self-knowledge point to the need to use both in the process of understanding our 
drives. Further, by contrasting them we highlight dangers present in both 
approaches, allowing us to cultivate an awareness, which mitigates some of their 
distorting effects. Ultimately we may also have to accept a certain modesty, 
acknowledging that the project of self-knowledge will never be complete, and that 
an exploration of the distortions that are part of our attempts to gain self-
knowledge are themselves informative of who we are.xxvi 
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